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Malzone: Who Cares About the Modern Creator?

WHO CARES ABOUT THE MODERN CREATOR?
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine putting hard work and energy into creating quality
content, spending hours editing to make the perfect piece, and
sharing it with your audience in hopes that they like it. Things seem
to be going great and your hard work is paying off – until you
stumble across your work being used by someone else! No, this is
not a story of finding pirated movies on Torrent; this is not a story
of seeing a YouTube video stealing your music. In fact, it is quite
the opposite. YouTube is no longer just a place where you can find
free versions of copyrighted works. It is now home to thousands
upon thousands of quality content creators – artists who create their
own copyrightable works and post them to YouTube.
Unlike major production companies, though, many
YouTubers work as sole proprietorships, with maybe one or two
people helping with editing, but without a full legal team that is the
benefit of working for an established corporation. This makes
YouTube content creators prime targets for misappropriation of
their works – because they lack the sophistication to know what to
do when they catch someone in the act.
While there are many instances and opportunities for
websites to take the content of others and use it without the creator’s
permission, such as marketplaces recreating original products from
Etsy store owners, companies repurposing an individual’s social
media posts, or taking an individual’s photos to create internet
memes, for simplicity, this paper will focus on a specific scenario:
a YouTube content creator’s work being used by online
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marketplaces such as Wish.com. Wish, incorporated in 2010,1 is an
online marketplace that offers products for much lower than retail
price by connecting the buyer directly with factory-merchants and
eliminating the retailer middleman.2 As great as Wish may be for
consumers, many YouTube creators and other artists have found
their works utilized by Wish merchants to advertise products. In the
case of a YouTube artist, it usually appears in the form of a
screengrab (taking a screenshot of a single still image from the
video) or thumbnail (the photo that appears as a preview for the
video before clicking to watch it) from one of the YouTuber’s
videos discussing the same or similar product to that being
advertised on Wish.
Here is a model example: Tina Yong, a YouTuber, is
considered a “beauty guru.” She records reviews of unique beauty
products on her series “Tina Tries It.”3 Each video on YouTube
shows up as a thumbnail along with the title and short description
of the video. On April 23, 2018, Ms. Yong posted a video titled
“NEW MICROBLADING EYEBROW TATTOO PEN – TINA
TRIES IT” where she tested out and reviewed the new product by
Maybelline.4 On December 17, 2018, after searching “eyebrow
tattoo pen” on Wish, one of the first results is for a “PHOERA
1

Company Overview of ContextLogic Inc., BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=12
7912549 (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
2
Katy Medium, Is the Wish App Legit or a Scam: The Real Reasons Why It’s so
Cheap, ToughNickel (Aug. 17, 2018), https://toughnickel.com/frugal-living/IsWish-App-Legit-Heres-How-the-Prices-are-so-Low.
3
Tina Yong, Playlist of “Tina Tries It” Series, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ZxIU6dUiY8&list=PL8U8CbIJnNKpsvM
WjEtK5Atru1XmqL386.
4
Tina Yong, NEW MICROBLADING EYEBROW TATTOO PEN – TINA TRIES
IT, YOUTUBE (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hxt_Z_NND4Y.
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Tattoo Brow ink pen.”5 One of the photos used to advertise the
product is the photo from Ms. Yong’s thumbnail on YouTube.6
Never mind that this is clearly advertising a knock-off product with
a picture of the Maybelline product, but the Wish merchant
presumably used this photo of Ms. Yong without her permission.
What are Tina Yong’s rights? Does she have any standing
to go up against Wish (or the individual merchants on Wish) and
reprimand them for using her photo? Even if she does have standing,
would she know that? Are there enough protections for Tina Yong
and many others like her? Who cares about the modern creator?
YouTubers and other creators in Europe are concerned that a new
European Union directive will threaten their online viability.7 Does
the United States care for the modern creator? This paper argues
that while there may be some protections for situations such as this,
they are not strong enough, nor do they provide the proper market
incentives to discourage misappropriation.
Part II of this paper will go through in detail each of the
possible rights Ms. Yong and her peers may have in bringing actions
against misappropriators. These include copyright infringement,
false advertising and false endorsement under the Lanham Act, state
publicity rights, FTC enforcement of false endorsements, and other
miscellaneous causes of action. Part III will suggest that these
protections are inadequate for these modern artists who lack
5

Ad for “PHOERA Automatic Matte Eyebrow Pencil Waterproof Eyebrow
Tattoo With Brush Long-lasting Cosmetics Eye Brow Pen 3 Colors”, WISH,
https://www.wish.com/search/eyebrow%20tattoo%20pen/product/5b178144505
a2124c7c665f9?&source=search.
6
See infra Appendix A.
7
Matt Reynolds, What is Article 13? The EU’s divisive new copyright plan
explained, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-isarticle-13-article-11-european-directive-on-copyright-explained-meme-ban; see
also, e.g., Nick Zammeti, No more videos from me due to Article 13!, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLDgygbSCSw&t=315s.
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corporate sophistication and will include proposals of necessary
policy changes, including a uniform publicity right and increased
FTC enforcement, in order to protect both creators and consumers.
II. PROTECTIONS
A. Copyright Infringement
Copyright is the most obvious protection available for
YouTubers facing this sort of appropriation. This section begins by
establishing the YouTuber’s valid copyright and demonstrates that
infringement has occurred, and how the infringers probably do not
have certain defenses. Next, this section discusses what sorts of
damages are available to YouTubers and shows that the calculation
of damages is very difficult. Finally, this section points out the
protections certain websites like Wish might take advantage of, such
as DMCA takedown procedures, which would insulate them from
liability and make recovery even more difficult and impractical for
small creators whose content has been stolen.
YouTube creators generally have their content protected in
two different copyrights. First is the video itself, which is
protectable as a “motion picture.”8 They also have a copyright in the
capture that is used in the thumbnail for each video as a photograph.9
This distinction between the two copyrights may be important in
determining whether infringement has occurred. So long as their
videos and thumbnails are “original works of authorship”10 and not
8

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2012).
Id. § 101 (2012) (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works); 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(5). While it used to be the case that many YouTubers chose a screengrab
from their videos to serve as the thumbnail, many YouTubers now choose to
upload a separate photograph to make up the thumbnail.
10
Id. § 102(b) (2012).
9
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simply an “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery,” they have copyrights that are valid
for the life of the author plus seventy years.11 YouTube also
acknowledges the rights of its creators and offers educational
content on how they can protect their rights from misuse within the
YouTube platform.12
At first glance, it seems clear that YouTubers finding their
content used in some way on websites like Wish have had their
rights infringed. Not only is there a literal copy of their work on
these sites, they are also being displayed to the public at the
direction of someone other than the owner.13 However, there are
some defenses available to the purported infringer that could block
liability for their use of the content. These come from fair use and
de minimis infringement.
The fair use defense is codified in the Copyright Act and
provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular

11

Id. § 302(a) (2012); I will assume for simplicity’s sake that each video is
created by a single author and that author is a natural person.
12
Copyright on YouTube, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/copyright/#support-and-troubleshooting (last
visited Dec. 19, 2018).
13
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;…(5) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly…”).
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case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include –
(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the market for
or value of the copyrighted work.14
Over time, courts have tried to interpret how to use and balance
these four fair use factors, culminating in several Supreme Court
cases. The first of its sort was Harper & Row v. Nation in 1985.15
In Harper, The Nation Magazine published part of President Gerald
Ford’s soon-to-be-published memoir ahead of its release, despite
copyright owners’ agreement with Time Magazine to give them first
serialization.16 Another landmark case is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
where the Court had to analyze whether a parody song could be
considered a fair use.17
In analyzing the first factor of fair use in Harper, the Court
found that on the purpose of use, “[t]he fact that a publication was
commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to
weigh against a finding of fair use.”18 Justice O’Connor went on to
state that “[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not
14

Id. § 107 (2012).
Harper & Row, Publishers. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
16
Id. at 542.
17
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994).
18
Harper, 471 U.S. at 562.
15
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whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price.”19 The character of the use as
far as the “propriety of the defendant’s conduct” is also important
for this first factor.20
In Campbell, the Court focused on whether or not the use of
the copyrighted work was “transformative.”21 The Court found that
“the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use.”22
Applying these parameters of the first factor to our scenario,
it seems to lead to a finding against fair use. First of all, the use by
Wish merchants and their cohorts is clearly commercial. These are
e-commerce websites looking to make a profit. The primary motive
is clearly commercial advantage. Merchants use these photos
particularly for their clear depiction of the subject product.
Furthermore, it would be hard to find that there is fair dealing in
using these photos without the owner’s permission. Ripping them
straight off of YouTube is unlikely to reflect the good character or
propriety of the defendant. Furthermore, under the Campbell
standard, it would be tenuous of the defendant to claim that its use
was transformative in any real way, for they generally do not
actually transform the actual screenshot (unless it is to blur out a
watermark or inverse the image to avoid being caught by automatic
copyright scanners). Additionally, the use in the copyrighted work
is generally to depict the subject product and show how it is used;
this is the same use that is generally demonstrated by the infringers
19

Id. at 562 (citing Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
503 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
20
Id. (citing 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05).
21
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
22
Id.
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when taking these images. A court would be hard-pressed to find
that there has been any transformative use.
On the second factor relating to the nature of the copyrighted
work, the Court in Harper puts emphasis on whether the work is
fiction or non-fiction, stating that there is generally a “greater need
to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy” in
order to disseminate facts.23 The Campbell Court does not further
elaborate on this second factor analysis.24 Although Tina Yong’s
make-up review videos are opinion pieces based on her experiences
with the products and not fictional works, the infringing use of the
copyrighted work does nothing to spread that opinion (in fact, they
often imply endorsements for products the YouTuber expressly
disapproves), and so it is unlikely the defendant in this case would
get any special treatment for it being a non-fiction copyrighted
work.
The next fair use factor, the amount and substantiality of the
portion used, is crucial for this fair use finding.25 In Harper, the
Court saw that the portion of the text from the memoir published in
the magazine, while only 13% of the infringing work, was
“essentially the heart of the book.”26 In contrast, the Court points
out that “a taking may not be excused merely because it is
insubstantial with respect to the infringing work,” explicitly noting
that the content used must be judged with a view to the plaintiff’s
original work.27 As Judge Learned Hand remarked, “no plagiarist

23

Harper, 471 U.S. at 563.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
25
Note that the Campbell Court’s analysis of the third and fourth factors are
irrelevant to this situation because they were addressing specifically how they
would apply to parody uses of copyrighted material. See Campbell at 586-94.
26
Harper, 471 U.S. at 564-65.
27
Id. at 565.
24
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can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not
pirate.”28
Here it might matter whether or not the infringer took a
screengrab from a YouTuber’s video itself or reproduced the
thumbnail photograph. If the infringer took the thumbnail, then the
entire copyrighted piece was used. If they used a screengrab, a court
might ask whether it was the heart of the video. However, it is also
important to recall that the display right that copyright owners have
explicitly applies to the “individual images of a motion picture.”29
Because of this explicit language, YouTubers have a greater
argument against fair use.
In analyzing the fourth factor in Harper, the Court had an
easy time of finding that Nation completely destroyed the market
intended to Time because Nation “scooped” the first serialization of
the memoir.30 In our scenario, however, it is unclear that the use by
Wish or the like will actually affect the market for the YouTuber’s
product (their video content). If anything, creators may make a
tenuous argument that if consumers see their photo connected with
the Wish products, and those products turn out to be lower quality
than they anticipate from seeing the YouTuber on the
advertisement, it may lower that YouTuber’s reputation among
viewers and decrease traffic to their channels, and so decrease their
ad revenues.
When interpreting the Supreme Court’s fair use analyses in
Harper and Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit notes that the four
factors cannot be “treated in isolation” and in any case “a given
factor may be more or less important in determining whether a
particular use should be considered fair,” such that “some of the
28

Id. (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.
1936)).
29
17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2012).
30
Harper, 471 U.S. at 565-69.
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factors weigh more heavily on the fair use determination than
others” depending on the circumstances of such case.31 Therefore,
the court will have to determine how much weight to give each
factor in Ms. Yong’s suit against her infringers. Because of the
entirely commercial use of the copyrighted content on Wish, this
author believes that the greatest weight will be given to the first
factor and little to no weight on the fourth. Consequently, there
would be no finding of fair use.
A quick note on the subject of de minimis copying is
worthwhile. Because the thumbnail of a YouTube video is
separately protected as a photograph, the de minimis analysis can
only possibly apply when the defendant takes a still from the video
itself. In addition to being a consideration in the third factor of the
fair use analysis,32 there is possibly a “more than de minimis”
requirement to establish a prima facie case of copying.33 However,
as undeveloped as this doctrine may be, it seems that its most
practical application is in analyzing whether the infringing work has
a substantial similarity to the original, in which case a de minimis
inquiry would be irrelevant in situations as are the subject of this
paper that consist of direct, literal copying.34 Furthermore, in respect
to the display right, as noted above, the individual images of a
motion picture or audiovisual work are protected and exclusively
reserved to the owner of the copyright of the whole work.35
Therefore, because the statute explicitly gives protection to these

31

Cambridge U. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
32
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012) (“the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”).
33
See 4 William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:10 (2018).
34
See id. at §§ 9:59, 9:60, 9:65; 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01(G) (2018). See
also On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001).
35
17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2012).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol29/iss2/1

10

Malzone: Who Cares About the Modern Creator?

2019] WHO CARES ABOUT THE MODERN CREATOR?

11

individual parts of the video, it would not be proper to find taking
one still from the video to be nonactionable as a de minimis use.
Supposing that Tina Yong’s claim does survive the fair use
and de minimis defenses, the next difficult hurdle she would need to
surpass is the calculation of damages. In addition to an injunction
stopping Wish’s merchants from utilizing her content,36 she may be
entitled to damages, profits, and attorney’s fees.37 An infringer can
be liable for either “the copyright owner’s actual damages and any
additional profits” or statutory damages.38
Actual damages and profits may be very difficult for Ms.
Yong to prove. In terms of actual damages, because the infringing
uses are not competitive with the original use, there may not be any
tangible damages that are not related to her reputation. However, a
YouTuber may be able to claim that the reputational damage
lessened the number of views and therefore the amount of ad
revenue the YouTuber received. This is probably unhelpful, though,
because these are entirely speculative damages. Whether a
YouTuber may be able to recover these sorts of damages depends
on the information available to them on how much revenue they lost
and proof that the infringement is directly related to those losses.
Recovering lost profits will also prove a challenge. In order
to collect “any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the
infringement,” the copyright owner must present proof of the
infringer’s gross revenues.39 Such profits do not need to be directly
from selling the copyrighted work (which is generally not at issue
in these scenarios),40 but may be indirectly attributable to the
36

17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
17 U.S.C. §§ 504, 505 (2012).
38
17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012).
39
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012).
40
However, there are similar claims from Etsy store owners seeing their products
advertised on Wish. See I Wish You Wouldn’t, THE MONARCH MOMMY (Oct. 21,
2016), https://themonarchmommy.com/2016/10/21/wish-you-wouldnt; Brittany
37
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infringing use.41 For example, if the use of the picture in their
advertisement increased traffic to the ad and thus increased sales,
those profits would be recoverable by the copyright owner.42 It is
then the burden of the defendant to prove deductible expenses and
any portion of the profit not attributable to the copyrighted work.43
The reason it may be difficult for the plaintiff to plead the proper
damages is because websites that infringe on YouTuber’s rights are
generally run by service providers and so do not necessarily have
records of the profits for each individual user. If the merchant using
the YouTuber’s content is a small manufacturer in China, as is
typically the case with Wish,44 it could be impracticable for the
unsophisticated creator to obtain information on gross revenue
unless the service provider can and does cooperate in revealing that
information.
It is thus more desirable to try to recover statutory damages
for infringement. However, § 412 of the Copyright Act disallows
recovery of statutory damages or attorneys’ fees if the infringed
work had not been registered prior to the infringement.45 While
there is no clear data on how many YouTubers actually register their
copyrighted materials with the Library of Congress, YouTube’s
own copyright guidance does not generally direct creators to do so

Sicard, Petition to Stop Wish.com from stealing images from handmade artists,
CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/wish-com-wish-com-steals-from-etsyartists (last visited Dec. 19, 2018). In such a scenario, actual damages would
indeed be relevant.
41
Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1550 (9th
Cir. 1989).
42
See id.
43
Id.
44
Medium, supra note 2.
45
17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012).
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or alert them to the benefits of statutory damages.46
Unsophisticated, small YouTubers may not know that they need to
register their content in order to secure certain protections unless
they did more research on the matter. Furthermore, there are
creators who upload content five days per week or more, and
registering each and every video prior to publication may not be
practicable, especially given the quick turnaround that often occurs
between filming and posting.47
Finally, even if a YouTuber can prove infringement, get past
defenses, and establish a proper calculation of damages, there is the
further challenge of finding the proper defendant. In our motivating
example, the most obvious defendant would be Wish: an
established, San Francisco-based corporation.48 However, Wish
will likely be able to avoid liability as a service provider that
complies with the DMCA Notice and Takedown procedures.49 This
would mean that instead the copyright owner must bring suit against
the individual infringing merchants. The difficulty with websites
like Wish is that their merchants are often small factories and
manufacturers in China.50 While international service and process
and other aspects of civil procedure are outside the scope of this
paper, due to the fact that Wish’s business model is to eliminate the
middle-man in commercial transactions, who would normally serve
as quality control and a presumably more local and established
46
Lesson: Protect your content with copyright, YOUTUBE, (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://creatoracademy.youtube.com/page/lesson/copyrightprotection#strategies-zippy-link-1.
47
See, e.g., Tati (@GlamLifeGuru), YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/user/GlamLifeGuru.
48
Company Overview, supra note 1.
49
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012); Wish Copyright Dispute Policy, WISH FOR
MERCHANTS (Mar. 8, 2016), https://merchant.wish.com/copyright-disputepolicy.
50
Medium, supra note 2.
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defendant,51 successfully filing and trying a suit against a small,
international manufacturer would be largely impossible. Even if it
were possible, recovery would be unlikely and would accomplish
little in the way of deterrence. In fact, Tati Westbrook, a popular
beauty YouTuber whose voice was recently used in an ad by a
knockoff make-up company52 said, “these guys today are small
potatoe [sic] fraudsters. They are without ethics and do not work
within the confines of the law, so threat of action or even an
injunction accomplishes nothing, they just change their logos and
open a new company.”53
While protection for copyright infringement seemed at first
the obvious solution to the YouTuber’s problem, there are certainly
sizable hurdles. Even if an action is sustainable and a content creator
were able to survive on the merits, recovery poses yet another
problem, as well as whether such a suit would even serve the proper
incentives to halt further infringements. As the rest of this
discussion will reveal, there is not necessarily a better alternative
for recovery available to these modern-day creators.
B. The Lanham Act §43(a)
The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 to codify federal
common law on trademark protection.54 It was an arduous process
51

Id.
Tati (@GlamLifeGuru), ADS THAT USE ME … WITHOUT PERMISSION,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KhyaoGN1iYM&lc=z233tp3idzemchapr04
t1aokgmpx5p1qwraov5lm4vglrk0h00410.1543452747280153.
53
Email from Tati Westbrook, YouTube Beauty Expert, to author (Nov. 28, 2018,
7:32 PM EST) (on file with author).
54
1 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 5:4 (5th ed. 2018) (hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK)
(citing S. Res. No. 1333, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946), U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274).
52
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that began with the introduction of the bill in 1938 and took eight
years to codify.55 Trademark law is unique in that Congress’s intent
in passing the law is actually embedded into the code:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce
within the control of Congress by making actionable
the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such
commerce; to protect registered marks used in such
commerce from interference by State, or territorial
legislation; to protect persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition; to prevent
fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable
imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights
and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions
respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair
competition entered into between the United States
and foreign nations.56
Protecting persons engaged in commerce from unfair competition,
fraud, and deception, makes the Lanham Act particularly attractive
for the scenario at hand.
Specifically relevant is section 43 of the Lanham Act which
protects false designations of origin, false description, or false
representation.57 Section 43(a) states in relevant part that:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services . . . uses in commerce any [mark],
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
55

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
57
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
56
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description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another
person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion,
misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged
by such act.58
Subsection (A) is generally considered to be a claim for false
association while subsection (B) is reserved for false advertising.59
These two prongs of § 43 may at first glance be relevant to Tina
Yong and her peers, but upon closer inspection and a review of
judicial interpretation, it becomes clear that YouTubers would
likely only be able to bring suit under § 43(a)(1)(A).
The type of claim a creator would probably bring is a sort of
false endorsement, with the idea being that the improper use of their
work will falsely imply that the artist endorses the product being
advertised. While it may be true that the Wish merchant is falsely
advertising the “PHOERA” product with an image of Tina Yong
using the Maybelline product, and misappropriating Ms. Yong’s
58

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 188, 122
(2014).

59
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copyrighted material, the elements of a § 43(a)(1)(B) false
advertising claim as interpreted by courts is not promising for Ms.
Yong. In order to adequately plead false advertising, the plaintiff
must allege:
(1) The defendant has made false or misleading
statements as to his own product or another’s;
(2) There is actual deception or at least a tendency to
deceive a substantial portion of the intended
audience;
(3) The deception is material in that it is likely to
influence purchasing decisions;
(4) The advertised goods traveled in interstate
commerce; and
(5) There is a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in
terms of declining sales, loss of good will, etc.60
In the past, courts have required that plaintiff be in direct or indirect
competition with the defendant in order to recover under this
section.61 However, in 2014, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Lexmark v. Static Control, in which it outlined the new
test for standing under false advertising § 43(a) claims.62
The new test under Lexmark is three-pronged. First and
foremost, the plaintiff must show an injury in fact under Article III
standing.63 Once this has been satisfied, a more specific inquiry is
conducted to determine whether the claim falls within the “zone of
60

Peek v. Whittaker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70461 (W.D.P.A. 2014) (citing
Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir.
2011)).
61
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992).
62
Lexmark, 572 U.S. 188.
63
Id.; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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interest” meant to be protected by Congress in enacting the statute.64
As mentioned earlier, Congress specifically delineated the zone of
interest of the Lanham Act;65 therefore, the plaintiff in a false
advertising case must allege an injury to a commercial interest in
reputation or sales.66 Finally, the plaintiff must satisfy the proximate
cause requirement and show whether the harm alleged has a
sufficiently close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.67
While it may seem that Ms. Yong may be able to claim injury to
reputation and that the harm was proximately caused by the unfair
advertising, the Court did not entirely do away with the competitor
requirement. Although there is no longer a bright line rule, the Court
noted that a plaintiff who is not in direct competition with the
defendant will often have a harder time establishing proximate
causation.68 Perhaps this is why the general consensus among courts
is to try false endorsement claims under § 43(a)(1)(A) instead.69
To prove a claim of false endorsement under § 43(a)(1)(A),
the plaintiff must allege “(1) it has a valid and legally protectable
mark; (2) it owns the mark; and (3) the defendant’s use of the mark
to identify goods or services causes a likelihood of confusion.”70
The crucial difference between this prong and false advertising is
that this requires the plaintiff have a trademark in the alleged misuse
in order to have standing to sue. Most courts have held that a

64

Lexmark, 572 U.S. 188.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
66
Lexmark, 572 U.S. 188.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 136
69
1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK, supra note 54 at § 27:88
70
Bd. of Dirs. of Sapphire Bay Condos. W. v. Simpson, 641 Fed. Appx. 113, 114
(3d Cir. 2015) (citing A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237
F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2000)).
65
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celebrity’s persona can serve as a trademark, allowing a false
endorsement claim to be brought under § 43(a)(1)(A).71
Because of its basis in trademark, courts tend to focus on the
confusion aspect of the statute in determining liability. Mark owners
may recover for trademark infringement when the alleged use is
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”72
Therefore, in the false endorsement context, the use of the
trademark must have a likelihood to “cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive” in regards to the association of the person
(by way of their personal trademark) with the product being
advertised.
The Ninth Circuit developed an eight-factor balancing test
for determining confusion in Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch.73
The eight-factors have been adopted by other circuits as well.74
These factors are:
(1) the level of recognition that the plaintiff
among the segment of the society for whom
defendant’s product is intended;
(2) the relatedness of the fame or success of
plaintiff to the defendant’s product;
(3) the similarity of the likeness used by
defendant to the actual plaintiff;
(4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5) marketing channels used;
(6) likely degree of purchaser care;

has
the
the
the

71

1 J. Thomas McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:31, fn. 6
(2d ed. 2018) (hereinafter RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY).
72
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2012).
73
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2001).
74
See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008); Ji v.
Bose Corp., 538 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass. 2008).
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(7) defendant’s intent on selecting the plaintiff; and
(8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.75
If we were to apply these factors to Ms. Yong’s specific scenario,
she would probably have a difficult time surviving summary
judgment for several reasons. She would need to prove that the use
of her picture was for the purpose of using her identity (and not just
because she is a generic person using the product) and was related
to the success of the product in that her identity would actually cause
shoppers to believe that she endorsed the product and cared about
such when purchasing the product. This would be difficult to prove,
because unless the typical viewer had the thumbnail from her
YouTube video and the Wish advertisement up side by side, it is
unlikely that they would recognize Ms. Yong from the ad
immediately. As a close-up photo of her eyes, it would be tenuous
to say this the company chose this photo to use Ms. Yong’s identity
to promote their product.
This issue of identification (the first Downing factor) is
particularly salient in false endorsement cases brought by noncelebrities. While celebrity status is not a legally defined term, and
is not per se required in order to bring a false endorsement claim,
there is a need for some sort of recognition in order for the false
endorsement to carry any weight. Even if the plaintiff is
recognizable by comparing photographs to the advertisement, if the
plaintiff is not known by anybody other than their close friends and
family, there is no likelihood that the general population of
consumers will put any weight on whether they endorse the product
or be confused by their presence in the advertisement.76
75

Downing, 265 F.3d at 1007-08.
Bondar v. LASplash Cosmetics, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175873, *27 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (“It does not require celebrity, only a likelihood of consumer confusion. Of
course, the misappropriation of a completely anonymous face could not form the

76
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National or worldwide fame is not required by courts to
prove recognition and confusion in false endorsement claims. A
niche celebrity may be someone with a high level of recognition in
their specific profession or line of business.77 Some courts recognize
false endorsement claims for plaintiffs short of celebrities.78 For
example, in Bondar v. LASplash, a fashion model was able to
survive a motion to dismiss for her false endorsement case because,
although she was not nationally recognized, her recognition within
the fashion industry made it reasonably likely that the public could
recognize her face on a beauty ad and think she endorsed the
product.79
The level of celebrity a YouTuber has and the YouTuber’s
recognition within his or her specific industry will dictate whether
they can succeed in a false endorsement claim. Tati
“GlamLifeGuru” Westbrook, with over 5 million subscribers to her
beauty tutorial and review channel80 will have a stronger claim to
fame in the beauty community than Susan Yara with 70,000
subscribers,81 who has had clips of her son used to endorse products

basis for a false endorsement claim, because consumers would not infer than an
unknown model was ‘endorsing’ a product, as opposed to lending her image to a
company for a fee.”). See also, Ji, 538 F. Supp. 2d 349 (finding that plaintiff was
had no recognition to consumers and therefore could not survive a claim for false
endorsement).
77
1 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY, supra note 71 at § 4:2.
78
See, e.g., Bondar, 2012 U.S. Dist. at *27 (“However, there is a level of
consumer recognition short of celebrity – as the term is usually understood –
capable of causing consumer confusion.”); Rubio v. Barnes and Noble, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 169147, *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Passelaigue v. Getty, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34004 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
79
Bondar, 2012 U.S. Dist. at *27-*29
80
Tati (@GlamLifeGuru), supra note 47.
81
Susan Yara (@SusanYara), YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/user/Susanyara (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
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she did not buy82 or Chelsey Bowen with 170,000 subscribers in the
crafting community83 who has had her crafts and projects falsely
advertised by others.84 However, are these lesser-known creators
any less deserving of protection? Perhaps they will find solace in
other rights of action, but it does not seem right that creators who
are victim to the same misappropriation are subject to different
levels of protection.
Even more disconcerting, where does Tina Yong fall in this
balancing? With more than 2.5 million subscribers,85 she has many
more than smaller creators, but only half the visibility of Tati
Westbrook. Where do we draw the line for recognition and celebrity
status? If she had four times as many subscribers, would using a
close-up photo of her eyes be more likely to cause recognition and
confusion? Or is her current standing at 2.5 million subscribers
enough? At what point does she gain Lanham Act protection? The
unpredictability of application of the Lanham Act makes it less than
ideal for reliance by unsophisticated YouTube creators.

82

Susan Yara (@SusanYara), Comment to ADS THAT USE ME … WITHOUT
PERMISSION, YOUTUBE (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KhyaoGN1iYM&lc=z233tp3idzemchapr04
t1aokgmpx5p1qwraov5lm4vglrk0h00410.1543452747280153.
83
Chelsey Bowen (@ChelseyDIY), YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEC9pCgh1o7lVQ4BmzxFIaA (last
visited Dec. 19, 2018).
84
Chelsey Bowen (@ChelseyDIY), Comment to ADS THAT USE ME …
WITHOUT PERMISSION, YOUTUBE (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KhyaoGN1iYM&lc=z233tp3idzemchapr04
t1aokgmpx5p1qwraov5lm4vglrk0h00410.1543452747280153.
85
Tina Yong (@makeupbytinayong), YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/user/makeupbytinayong (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol29/iss2/1

22

Malzone: Who Cares About the Modern Creator?

2019] WHO CARES ABOUT THE MODERN CREATOR?

23

C. Publicity Rights
Born out of common law and the notion of the right to
privacy, many states have adopted what are deemed “publicity
rights” laws, protecting the nonconsensual use of a person’s identity
in commerce. Publicity rights are similar to the false endorsement
action under the Lanham act in that both require the use of a
person’s identity without their permission. However, publicity
rights are more accessible in that no trademark is required and is
generally more available to non-celebrities. On the other hand,
publicity rights are less accessible because the specific protections
are protected on a state-by-state basis and so are restricted by
jurisdiction, choice of law, and the language of each state’s
particular protections, whereas the Lanham Act is federal law and
generally has equal protections across the country.
This being said, questions of jurisdiction, choice of law, and
the complexities of every state’s protections are beyond the scope
of this paper. Instead, this section focuses mostly on the general
stipulation of publicity rights as provided by the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition.
According to the Restatement, “One who appropriates the
commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent
the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes
of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the
rules state in §§ 48 and 49.”86 This is fairly typical of a bare-bones
protection for publicity rights, and at least thirteen states have
adopted some version of this provision (some giving even stronger
rights and protections).87
Most of the tension in publicity rights cases revolves around
identifying the commercial value of a person’s identity, namely who
86
87

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (2018).
Id. See, e.g., NY Civ. Rights L. §§ 50-51; Cal. Civ. C. §§990, 3344.
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has a commercial value and how it is ascertained. It is important to
note that while the majority consensus is that publicity rights protect
celebrities and non-celebrities alike, there is some case law that
suggest certain jurisdictions will only extend protections to
celebrities.88 Modern case law and statutes tend to extend protection
to non-celebrities.89
Once we accept that celebrity status is not necessary to
establish a publicity right, we then turn to how identifiable the
plaintiff must be – how recognizable must the appropriation be – for
them to survive a motion to dismiss. The leading case on this
question comes from the New York Court of Appeals in Cohen v.
Herbal Concepts, Inc.90 In Cohen, the plaintiffs, Susan Cohen and
her four-year-old daughter, while on vacation were photographed
from behind, without their consent, while bathing in a stream
located on their friends’ private property.91 The photographer then
sold the photograph to Herbal Concepts, who in turn used the
photograph in several ads for their product “Au Naturel,” which was
“designed to help women eliminate body cellulite, those ‘fatty
lumps and bumps that won’t go away.’”92 The ads appeared in two
editions of House and Garden and one edition each of House
Beautiful and Cosmopolitan.93 Susan’s husband Ira recognized his
wife and daughter while reading one of these magazines.94
88

See, e.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984); Ali
v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Products, Inc., 250 Ga. 135
(1982); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (2018).
89
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d; 1 RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY, supra note 71 at § 4:16.
90
Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984).
91
Id. at 382.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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While defendants argued that because their faces were not
visible in the photograph, plaintiffs were thus not recognizable, the
court found otherwise.95 Interpreting the New York publicity right,
the court stated:
The statute is designed to protect a person’s identity,
not merely a property interest in his or her “name”,
“portrait” or “picture”, and thus it implicitly requires
that plaintiff be capable of identification from the
objectionable material itself. . . . That is not to say
that the action may only be maintained when
plaintiff’s face is visible in the advertising copy.96
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, according to the highest
court in New York, the plaintiff “must satisfy the court that the
person in the photograph is capable of being identified from the
advertisement alone.”97 The court relies on “the extent to which
identifying features are visible, and the distinctiveness of those
features.”98 In this case of the two women bathing, the court looked
at the plaintiffs’ “hair, bone structure, body contours and stature and
their posture.”99 In addition, the court found that the fact that the
plaintiff’s husband testified to recognizing his wife and daughter in
the magazine was prima facie sufficient to prove identifiability.100
If we were to apply the standard in Cohen to Tina Yong’s
case, the fact that this author was able to identify her could
potentially be prima facie sufficient to prove recognition, allowing
95

Id. at 385.
Id. at 384.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 309.
100
Id. at 309-10. (see also footnote suggesting that plaintiff’s ability to identify
self might also be sufficient).
96
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her action to proceed. However, without testimony of actual
recognition, the court would have to look at the identifying qualities
of the photo used, and it might be unlikely that a photograph of just
her eyes would be sufficient. Would eyes and nose be enough?
While the court said that the full face does not need to be present,
what is enough to satisfy identifiability absent actual recognition?
While we may be satisfied that celebrity status is not
required to determine recognition of the plaintiff’s identity, it might
still be relevant in ascertaining damages.101 One of the elements of
the publicity right is that the defendant must use the plaintiff’s
identity for commercial advantage. While a celebrity image would
likely give commercial advantage in the form of an endorsement
and familiarity, a non-celebrity does not produce that effect. Instead,
oftentimes the commercial advantage from use of a non-celebrity
identity comes from the fact that the person looks aesthetically
pleasing, or is a “typical” person consumers can relate to.102
The publicity rights protections might be more forgiving
than, say, the Lanham Act; however, they do not come without their
challenges. As mentioned earlier, publicity rights are available on a
state-by-state basis and there are variations across statutes, common
law, and application. Where the YouTuber can attain jurisdiction
could very well dictate the strength of their protections; this
provides little predictability. Furthermore, when close-up images of
YouTubers are used in these advertisements, it is unclear how well
they can be identified to the point of surviving a movement for
summary judgment. Finally, the measure of damages for a noncelebrity is unclear and so is an inadequate deterrent to those who
misappropriate in the first place.

101
102

1 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY, supra note 71 at § 3:12.
Id. at § 3:13.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol29/iss2/1

26

Malzone: Who Cares About the Modern Creator?

2019] WHO CARES ABOUT THE MODERN CREATOR?

27

D. FTC Enforcement
Congress has granted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
the power to prevent the use of “unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practice in or
affecting commerce.”103 In response to this power, the FTC released
its Endorsement Guide in 1975,104 most recently updated in 2009.105
While the Guides are not on their own statutory or regulatory
authority, they give a good outline of the FTC’s position on
endorsements and provide guidance for what would be considered
good practice.106
The FTC defines an endorsement as:
[A]ny advertising message (including verbal
statements, demonstrations, or depictions of the
name, signature, likeness or other identifying
personal characteristics of an individual or the name
or seal of an organization) that consumers are likely
to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or
experiences of a party other than the sponsoring
advertiser, even if the views expressed by that party
are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser.107
The Commission continues to dictate what would be a proper
endorsement and what it must contain in order to be good practice
and avoid adverse action against their use. An endorsement must
103

FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Roobina Ohanian, Recent Trends in the Law of
Endorsement Advertising: Infomercials, Celebrity Endorsers and Nontraditional
Defendants in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 607
(1991).
105
16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2009).
106
16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (2009); Kertz & Ohanian, supra note 104 at 607-08.
107
16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b) (2009).
104
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“reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the
endorser”108 and must “not be presented out of context or reworded
so as to distort in any way the endorser’s opinion or experience with
the product.”109
The FTC uses a three-step inquiry when determining
whether an advertisement is deceptive: “(i) what claims are
conveyed in the ad, (ii) whether those claims are false, misleading,
or unsubstantiated, and (iii) whether the claims are material to
prospective consumers.”110 In considering the first step of the
inquiry, the Commission “will deem an advertisement to convey a
claim if consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances
would interpret the advertisement to contain that message”111 from
the perspective of the likelihood of “at least a significant minority
of reasonable consumers” to believe such a claim asserted.112
This author was unable to find any claims that have been
tried or are currently pending that are similar to the situation at hand
in this paper. However, applying the same analysis as in false
endorsement under the Lanham Act requires the conclusion that
some YouTubers would have a hard time meeting this threshold.
Using Ms. Yong as our example, if she is arguing that the Wish
merchant falsely claims that she endorsed the product being
advertised, that would need to be ascertainable by at least a
significant minority of reasonable consumers. Most reasonable
consumers would be likely to believe that the girl in the photo was
just a paid model used to advertise the product, and not some famous
influencer expressing her endorsement of it.
108

16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (2009).
16 C.F.R. § 255.1(b) (2009).
110
POM Wonderful, LLC v. F.T.C., 777 F.3d 478, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
111
Id. (citing Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992)).
112
Id. (citing Telebrands Corp., 140 FTC 278, 291 (2005), aff’d, 457 F.3d 354
(4th Cir. 2006)).
109
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However, this is another instance where the popularity (or
celebrity status) of a YouTuber is relevant. For example, Tati
Westbrook’s voice was taken from several of her videos and used
in an advertisement for an eyeshadow product.113 By the sound of
the advertisement, Ms. Westbrook’s distinctive voice (among
others) is clearly heard supposedly exclaiming her praise of the
product.114 With over 5 million subscribers, her popularity being
within the beauty community and this being a beauty product, it is
possible that a court or the Commission would find that a
“significant minority” would believe this claim.
For argument’s sake, we will continue with the presumption
that at least some YouTubers would be able to find protection under
an FTC action. Do Ms. Westbrook or her peers have standing to sue
under the statute? The general consensus on this question is a
resounding no, they do not.115 In response to this, many states have
adopted “little FTC” statutes which provide for a private right of
action to individuals injured by the types of actions restricted by the
federal statute.116 However, there is a lack of consistency among
these state statutes. Some, for example, protect only consumers,
which would exclude Tati Westbrook, Tina Yong, and other
YouTubers since they do not purchase products from the
defendant.117 Other states require there be an effect on the public
113

Tati (@GlamLifeGuru), supra note 52.
Id.
115
Kertz & Ohanian, supra note 104 at 629 (referencing Freedman v. Meldy’s,
Inc., 587 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279
(9th Cir. 1973); Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir.
1974)); 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK, supra note 54 at § 27:119.
116
Neil A. Helfman, Proof of Statutory Unfair Business Practices, 36 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3d 221, §§ 4, 5 (2018); Kertz & Ohanian, supra note 104 at 631635.
117
Helfman, supra note 116 at § 4. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-2(D); W.
VA. CODE § 46A-6-106.
114
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interest before accepting the private claims.118 The particular stateby-state considerations are outside the scope of the paper; however,
it is obvious that there are inconsistencies across jurisdictions that
adds to the level of uncertainty of protections for YouTubers.
The FTC does not monitor every single advertisement in the
country; instead, it conducts investigations “based on letters from
consumers or businesses, Congressional inquiries, and advice from
consumer protection advocates.”119 Further, the FTC will only
initiate an action “after a substantial number of complaints about a
particular activity bring it to the FTC’s attention.”120 This implies
that either the offended YouTuber knows to report to the FTC every
instance of false endorsement he or she comes across or enough of
their subscribers must report to the FTC an instance of false
endorsement for the FTC’s attention to be caught. This puts an
extremely heavy and unrealistic burden on the creators to monitor
the internet for misappropriation of their content and/or to make a
call to action to their subscribers to come to their aid in addition to
the requirement that they be knowledgeable enough to know to do
so.
Furthermore, it has been argued that the FTC is not doing
enough to protect the market from false and deceptive
advertising.121 Since at least the 1990s there has been inadequate
FTC enforcement, as they often only take action after “public outcry
and Congressional inquiry.”122 The FTC posts on its website certain
data and reports of recent developments.123 Recently, the most
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important undertakings by the FTC involve phone scams124 and
social media influencers who do not properly disclose their
connections to sponsors (the complete opposite problem at issue
here).125 A search of all FTC cases and proceedings for anything
containing the term “endorsement” came up with only two results,
both related to collusion and not a false endorsement of the sort
contemplated in this paper.126
Based on the lack of action by the FTC, the uncertainty of
whether YouTubers could satisfy the FTC’s inquiry of whether the
use would be considered an endorsement, and the variation among
states’ private rights of action, protection under this doctrine is not
ideal for Tina Yong and her colleagues.
E. Miscellaneous Misrepresentation Claims
In addition to the four previously discussed possible actions
available to YouTube creators, it is worth briefly noting that there
are potentially other types of viable claims for misrepresentation.
Suits alleging consumer misrepresentation can come from common
124

Consumer Sentinel Network Date Book 2017: Executive Summary, FTC
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-staffreports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2017/executive-summary
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reports with a contact method identified.”).
125
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Social Media Influencers, FTC (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2017/09/csgo-lotto-owners-settle-ftcs-first-evercomplaint-against; PR Firm and Publisher Settle FTC Allegations They
Misrepresented Product Endorsements as Independent Opinions, Commercial
Advertising
as
Editorial
Content,
FTC
(Nov.
13,
2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/11/pr-firm-publishersettle-ftc-allegations-they-misrepresented.
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law fraud, or negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty under
the Uniform Commercial Code, state Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices laws, and the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.127 However, a crucial aspect of these claims is
the necessity of reliance.128
To survive in any of these actions, the YouTuber would not
only have to buy the product from the company inappropriately
using their likenesses, but would somehow have to prove they relied
on their own (false) endorsement in purchasing the product. While
the law is full of legal fictions, certainly this would not suffice in
any jurisdiction. Because other consumers are not likely to know of
the misrepresentation in an advertisement using a non-celebrity
YouTuber’s face, they would not think to make a misrepresentation
claim on their behalf. Therefore, by restricting recovery only to
consumers who rely, there is an “under-deterrence of fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentations.”129
There may be other forms of common law torts or other state
laws that provide better protection for these creators; however,
because they rely on jurisdictional precedent and cannot be widely
applied in general, they fall outside the scope of this paper.
III. PROPOSAL
From the preceding analysis of the several routes a YouTube
creator may go about seeking protection from nonconsensual use of
their work, it is clear that there is no perfect remedy currently
available. While some protections exist, the extent and application
127
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of any are unclear or do not apply to the same extent to every
YouTuber.130 As a result, there is little predictability or consistency
among the options. Some rely on where jurisdiction may be
obtained, others depend on the popularity of the specific creator
whose work has been misappropriated, and nearly all rely on how
recognizable the nonconsensual use is.
The best places to look for strong protection are most likely
publicity rights and FTC false advertising enforcement. However,
publicity rights are jurisdictional and FTC cooperation has been
minimal, if it exists at all. Further, the proper deterrent effect is
clearly not currently present. Therefore, I propose that a major
overhaul of the publicity rights doctrine is necessary. There needs
to be a push toward adopting either a uniform publicity right across
the fifty states or a federal publicity right. This would provide more
predictability and even application to original content creators.
Furthermore, the FTC needs to be alerted to this growing
phenomenon and take action to enforce false advertisements and
false endorsements. Creating a federal private right of action for
false endorsements is not likely to be satisfactory because it puts too
heavy a burden on individual, unsophisticated creators. Instead, the
FTC needs to take up the cause and shift its attention from attacking
social media influencers to protecting them.
Neither of these solutions are perfect, though. As noted
above, there are still gaps in publicity and FTC protections,
specifically in regards to identifiability and strength of
endorsement. It is my hope that where these may be deficient, other
protections such as copyright may be able make up some of the
difference. However, this paper is not meant to produce an
absolutely perfect solution. Rather, the goal is to alert others to this
issue and spark a wider conversation on the topic in order to find
that best solution.
130
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IV. CONCLUSION
By the simple fact that today’s creators and content owners
are not able to stop others from using their content and likeness
without their permission,131 there is a problem with the current
system of protections available when someone misappropriates
content.
In order to encourage creativity and discourage false
advertising, better disincentives are in order. Copyright does not
provide the proper deterrent damages, trademark does not protect
everyone, publicity rights are neither predictable nor uniform, the
FTC is not involved, and other protections are also unpredictable.
The internet is not going anywhere and seemingly neither
are those who abuse its accessibility. Someone needs to care about
the modern creator and put an end to the exploitation of their
creativity.
Jacqueline Malzone*
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Apendix A

Figure 1 - Search Result from Wish using Tina Yong's video thumbnail.
Source:https://www.wish.com/search/eyebrow%20tattoo%20pen/product/5b178
144505a2124c7c665f9?&source=search

Figure 2 - YouTube thumbnails
Source:https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=eyebrow+microblading
+pen
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